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Bruce B. Janz

Elements of Philosophy-in-Place: Learning from African Philosophy

 

In Philosophy in an African Place and related papers, I constructed a theory of philosophy-in-place which both drew from African philosophy and helped to clear away some problematic barriers within the field. In particular, I distinguished between spatial and platial philosophy, or philosophy meant to defend a territory and define intellectual borders and citizenship as opposed to philosophizing in a place, from African lived experience.

There are three key elements to understanding how philosophy might operate in place. The first is an understanding of the myriad ways to understand the concept of place within philosophy and related disciplines. “Place” is not a single concept, but is shorthand for a range of concepts, some of which exist in tension with others. These concepts have developed in their own (disciplinary) places to answer specific questions and fill specific needs. Philosophy has come late to this discussion – there is a great deal on philosophy of place, but very little on philosophy-in-place. The place of place in philosophy has to be developed in light of the questions that are raised in different places. My example here will be African philosophy, which provides an excellent site for thinking about the nature of place in philosophy.

The second element to understanding philosophy-in-place is understanding its structure, that is, the conceptual elements which contribute to philosophy taking its own place seriously. I outlined 10 elements of philosophy-in-place in Philosophy in an African Place; here I will touch on only a couple of them to illustrate the issues that arise in the practice of philosophy-in-place. In particular, I want to talk about what I call the “topeme”, or the units which, when assembled, produce intelligible place. Again the example will be African philosophy, in which we have versions of place at several levels (“African”, “Kenyan”, “Luo”, etc.) which address different kinds of questions, and which describe different kinds of places which can provide the basis for the generation of new questions and hence new concepts.

Finally, the third element of understanding philosophy-in-place is understanding the way in which the analysis of questions form a central role in philosophy-in-place. Following the work of Michel Meyer (Of Problematology and other works) and Mieke Bal (Travelling Concepts in the Humanities: A Rough Guide), I will argue that the interrogation of questions within a conceptual ecology rooted in place is a prerequisite for a coherent and robust philosophy-in-place. Questions are rooted in places because they draw on concepts that have currency. To interrogate them simultaneously lays bare the debts and duties they have to those places, and also allows the concepts that derive from them to participate in a larger philosophical conversation. In this way, philosophy retains its move to the universal, while recognizing those debts and duties (to use Derrida’s phrase).

These elements give a brief overview of a full-fledged philosophy-in-place. The benefit of philosophizing in these terms is, as Deleuze and Guattari put it, the “creation of concepts” adequate to a place and enriching to the world of philosophy.

 

 

Bruce B. Janz is Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy, Director, UCF Center for Humanities & Digital Research, and Graduate Faculty, Texts and Technologies Ph.D.

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